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Abstract 
 
This paper reviews and assesses the state of the data to describe and monitor mining 
trends in the pan-Arctic. It constructs a mining index and discusses its value as a social 
impact indicator and discusses drivers of change in Arctic mining. The widely available 
measures of mineral production and value are poor proxies for economic effects on 
Arctic communities. Trends in mining activity can be characterized as stasis or decline in 
mature regions of the Arctic, with strong growth in the frontier regions. World prices and 
the availability of large, undiscovered and untapped resources with favorable access and 
low political risk are the biggest drivers for Arctic mining, while climate change is a 
minor and locally variable factor. Historical data on mineral production and value is 
unavailable in electronic format for much of the Arctic, specifically Scandinavia and 
Russia; completing the historical record back to 1980 will require work with paper 
archives. The most critically needed improvement in data collection and reporting is to 
develop comparable measures of employment: the eight Arctic countries each use 
different definitions of employment, and different methodologies to collect the data. 
Furthermore, many countries do not report employment by county and industry, so the 
Arctic share of mining employment cannot be identified. More work needs to be done to 
develop indicator measures for ecosystem service flows. More work also needs to be 
done developing conceptual models of effects of mining activities on fate control, 
cultural continuity and ties to nature for local Arctic communities. 
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Overview 
This analysis is a component of a larger project known as the Arctic Observations 
Network Social Indicators Project (AON-SIP), which in turn is part of a science initiative 
known as the Study of Environmental Arctic Change (SEARCH).1 The goal of SEARCH 
is to understand the nature, extent and future development of the system-scale changes 
presently seen in the Arctic. The SEARCH program of research is focused on climate 
change in the context of other global changes underway, with the intent to identify 
knowledge that will help people respond to environmental change. The SEARCH 
Implementation Plan identifies initial priorities of SEARCH, including:  
1. Develop an integrated pan-Arctic human dimension observation system based on 
existing data;  
2. Develop stakeholder networks to identify relevant observations and predictions, 
and to help understand the dynamics of the Arctic system; and,  
3. Develop and apply models to a pan-Arctic database to advance our understanding 
of environmental change and to identify data gaps that could be filled in 
subsequent research or agency initiative. 
As part of SEARCH, AON-SIP is intended to contribute to the long term goal of 
identifying adaptive strategies based on an understanding of the dynamics of change in 
the Arctic. A top SEARCH priority is to ensure that the Arctic Observation Network 
(AON) includes the measures necessary to an analysis of Arctic change. AON-SIP is a 
first step. We are compiling existing data for components of the Arctic system that are 
likely to involve climate-human interactions. Our objectives are to assess the adequacy of 
existing data and to recommend additions to the Arctic observation network where 
necessary to fill critical gaps. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between this project and three major science initiatives: 
the Study of Arctic Environmental Change (SEARCH), the Arctic Observation Network 
(AON), and the Arctic Social Indicators initiative (ASI). 
AON-SIP is funded by the National Science Foundation as part of NSF’s Arctic 
Observation Network program. AON science priorities are largely driven by SEARCH, a 
federal interagency science initiative. Hence AON, and AON-SIP, are intended to 
contribute to the science goals of SEARCH.  Arctic Social Indicators (ASI), is an 
initiative of the Arctic Council and a follow-up to the Arctic Human Development Report 
(AHDR). The goal of ASI is to recommend a small set of social indicators that could be 
used to monitor change in the Arctic. ASI is recommending two sets of indicators: one 
based on existing data, the other requiring new data collection. AON-SIP is designed to 
complement ASI science priorities. 
AON-SIP focuses on four components of the Arctic system where climate change and 
people are likely to interact: (1) commercial fisheries; (2) marine mammal hunting; (3) 
tourism; and (4) oil, gas, mining and marine transportation. A fifth project focus is on 
social outcome indicators that may be affected by human interactions with environmental 
                                                 
1  Project website: http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/projects/search-hd/index.htm  
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change, and specifically the six dimensions identified in AHDR and ASI: material 
success, health, education, fate control, ties with nature, and cultural continuity. The 
complete datasets and detailed documentation are available at www.search-hd.net. 
 
Figure 1. Arctic Observation Network Social Indicators Project Relationships with 
Science Initiatives 
 
 
AON-SIP is part of the Arctic Observation Network. We are designing our project to 
foster integrated analysis across the physical, natural, and social sciences. Our database 
project uses the Arctic geospatial data platform, Arctic-Rapid Integrated Monitoring 
System (Arctic-RIMS): a database that contains a growing number of physical, 
biological, and social science variables. The goal of Arctic-RIMS is to make these data 
easily available for integrated analysis. Our project team works with other AON 
investigators to foster the development of Arctic-RIMS as well as other integrated 
databases. 
This paper reports AON-SIP project analysis for one arena of Arctic change, specifically 
the mining component. 
Background 
Arctic oil and gas prospects, and the ensuing, contentious diplomatic relations that have 
resulted between circumpolar countries, have received widespread attention in recent 
years. By contrast, the expansion of Arctic mining has proceeded with little fanfare. 
Employment growth in Alaska’s mining sector grew at six times the pace of the 
petroleum sector’s employment growth since 1990. In Canada, the value of diamond 
mining has outstripped oil and gas extraction in the Northwest Territories (NWT) for the 
past decade (McDonald et al 2006). In Alaska, Canada and Greenland, recent regulatory 
changes and policies have encouraged the development of new mines (Borrell 2004; 
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Cope 2004; Carter 2007). And Russian mega-companies like Norilsk have extended their 
global reach, buying into operations in Finland and Arctic Canada (Mining Exploration 
News, 2008). 
Mining, like oil and gas, has the potential to both spur economic development and create 
wealth, but also harm the environment and irrevocably shape the social dynamics of 
Arctic communities and indigenous ways of life. Mining development in the Arctic can 
be further complicated by an extreme environment, remote locations, and a limited labor 
supply. Mining’s uncertain socio-economic impact is also of concern in regions where an 
informal economy – particularly subsistence hunting and herding – is a critical cultural 
component and essential to the quality of life of local inhabitants (AHDR 2004).  
Within the Arctic, mining regions can be categorized as either “resource frontier 
regions,” or “mature” regions (also known as “downward transitional areas”) 
(Sugden,1982; Duhaime 2004). Arctic Scandinavia is a mature region.  Mines in 
Scandinavia have operated since the 1950s and are well integrated into a national 
transportation network. They have generated widespread economic spin-offs and are 
central to local and regional economies.  
In frontier regions like Alaska, the Canadian Territories, Nunavut, and potentially 
Greenland, “economic decoupling” is more characteristic: the economic benefits of 
mining are largely exported, and the control of resources is dictated from afar (Duhaime 
2004). Value-added industries, like the refining and industrial application of minerals, 
remain largely undeveloped. Most NWT diamonds, for example, are exported out of 
Canada as rough, or uncut. Exploration in Greenland has jumped in recent years, and new 
mines have opened, but are under pressure from falling prices (McDonald 2006; 
Sørensen 2008). Mining in frontier regions, where costs are high, is particularly sensitive 
to price fluctuations (Duhaime 2004). Developments in “benefit sharing agreements” and 
“corporate social responsibility” are securing regional benefits and mitigating negative 
impacts to a certain degree, though the threat of resource dependency remains, sewing 
vulnerability into a fledgling frontier economy.  
Mining does not exist in Iceland or the Faeroe Islands (except sand and gravel), though 
large smelting operations, supplied by Scandinavian ore, contribute significantly to 
Iceland’s economy. 
Mine production is classified as mineral fuels (mostly coal), iron, ferro-alloy and non-
ferrous minerals (with myriad industrial applications), precious metal ores (mostly gold 
and silver), or industrial minerals including diamonds. Oil and gas, sand, gravel and 
quarry stone are also classified as mining, though they are not considered here.  
The Arctic contributes a small share of global production of minerals like titanium (.3 
percent) and bauxite (1.9 percent), but contributes as much as 40 percent to the global 
production of palladium (used by the auto and electronics industries, among others), 26 
percent of diamond gem stones, and 23 percent of industrial diamonds (Lindholdt 2006).  
Arctic Russia with abundant reserves and large-scale production accounts for the largest 
share of Arctic mining (Linholdt 2006), but other regions are increasingly important, 
including one of the world’s largest zinc mines in remote Alaska, and the world’s second 
largest underground mine in Kiruna, Sweden. Greenland’s rapid movement towards 
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exploration and production marks a new era in Arctic mining, and therefore a new era in 
Arctic economics and society. It is unclear how recent volatility and price fluctuations 
will shape current developments, however, and what the implications are for countries 
and communities dependant on resources with notoriously volatile prices. Data for 
mining in the Arctic has been irregular and inconsistent - either because of its proprietary 
nature, different reporting standards, or their inclusion into greater numbers for the 
country at large. Mining’s contribution to Arctic economies therefore remains unclear.  
In this paper we discuss the development of indicators for monitoring social effects of 
mining activities, and drivers of change in mining activities in the Arctic. The analysis 
provides insight into how prices and production in frontier regions relate and the 
changing relationship between production and employment. The goal is to contextualize 
mining’s contribution to social and economic development by comparing data across 
regions and across time. We describe trends in mining across the circumpolar north and 
highlight systemic shortcomings in information that make comparisons and evaluation 
difficult. Other drivers of Arctic mining discussed include political developments in 
newly self-governed regions, and climate change. Climate change as a driver has very 
small effect at the margin, relative to the major drivers of price, infrastructure and 
technology, and policy as it affects access, the costs of development, and the business 
climate for long-term investments. 
What would we really like to know and monitor? 
The Arctic Social Indicators Project aims to measure outcomes in the six dimensions of 
human development identified in the Arctic Human Development Report:  
• Material well-being 
• Health 
• Education 
• Fate control 
• Ties to nature 
• Cultural continuity 
Compiling social outcomes data is the primary task of other researchers in the AON-SIP 
project. (See Kruse et al., 2011; Berman, 2011; and Hamilton, 2011) Here we are 
concerned with the linkages between resource development activities and social 
outcomes. The AON-SIP conceptual model explicitly identifies two pathways of 
interactions between development activities and social outcomes: economic effects and 
ecosystem services, with institutions as a mediating layer. Several strands of current 
research suggest, however, that there are intangible pathways and effects that are also 
important, particularly with respect to fate control, ties to nature and cultural continuity.  
Haley and Magdanz (2008) speculate that increasing integration in the market economy 
may have mixed effects, decreasing strong social ties and well-being while increasing 
material standards of living. Similarly, Wernham et al (2009) discuss the potential effects 
of sudden increases in discretionary income, increases in social inequality, and rotating 
mine shifts may affect social and psychological health. Haley, et al. (2009) discuss the 
potential effects of migration, time with children, community conflict, and changing 
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patterns of social ties on cultural continuity, and discuss incorporation of local knowledge 
in resource decision making as a factor in fate control. Several authors in Earth Matters: 
Indigenous People, the Extractive Industries and Corporate Social Responsibility 
(O’Faircheallaigh and Ali, 2008) discuss how corporate social responsibility and 
contextual factors may affect fate control by indigenous people in the course of resource 
development.  
In this project we did not collect indicator data on ecosystem services or the less tangible 
processes that affect fate control and cultural continuity. Our emphasis on currently 
available, time series data has led us to an almost exclusive focus on economic and 
production data. The economic effects of mining activity are easier to measure with 
existing data. The economic benefits derived from mining can fuel improvements in 
material well-being, health, education and institutions for local governance. (Haley et al. 
2009) The indirect effects of economic activity on ties to nature, cultural activities and 
sense of fate control are more ambiguous and very context-specific. 
Mining lifecycle stages 
We begin the discussion by defining the lifecycle stages of mining activity, 
understanding that social effects will differ at different stages. We distinguish seven 
lifecycle stages of mining activities: exploration, pre-development permitting, 
development, operations, expansion, temporary slow down or shutdown, and 
decommissioning and reclamation.  
Exploration is the precursor to all other activity. Exploration activities, which typically 
involve a handful of geologists spending time in the field, are relatively small scale, with 
correspondingly small costs and social impacts.  
The predevelopment stage is characterized by assessment of the volume and grade of the 
ore and metallurgic assessment; scoping development options and assessing costs; 
financial planning; and assessing political risks for mine development. These activities 
are typically conducted by in-house specialists and contracted consultants working in 
corporate offices and, while more extensive and higher cost than exploration activities, 
they are still small compared to mine development, and have few direct impacts on the 
region. The permit process may involve public review, and that process may have 
political implications for local communities.  
If the predevelopment stage gives the project a green light, development activities begin, 
including securing permits, final design, constructing facilities, and commencing 
operations. Actual development and operation of the mine generates new information 
about the geology, the technological challenges, the costs and the environmental risks, 
which may trigger reassessment and revised plans. The development stage has significant 
social effects through employment and potential effects on ecosystem services. 
Employment is typically higher in the construction phase than in operations, and there 
may be social impacts associated with temporary workers. Operations also mark the start 
of different revenue streams that may enter the local economy, such as royalties, taxes, 
rents, local purchases, contributions, profits and dividends. There also may be changes in 
population or in the character of community life. 
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Activities associated with mine construction and startup can create abrupt changes in the 
local ecosystem. If there are any social impacts associated with these changes, they are 
likely to be felt more acutely in the short term; in the longer term, people adapt and the 
changed environment becomes familiar. On the other hand, there may be more subtle or 
cumulative effects, such as contamination and the effects on microorganisms or human 
health, that manifest over time. Such long term effects may have more profound social 
consequences. Another type of effect is the risk of an extraordinary event with severe 
consequences. The existence of risk may have social impacts on governance, investment, 
or sense of security and fate control.  
Expansion activities can expand the scale of the mine and associated impacts, or can 
extend the operating life of the mine and defer the impacts associated with closure. 
Expansion activities require the same cycle of planning and permitting as the pre-
development and development stages, and has similar drivers. Because it is building on 
the existing infrastructure and activities, the character of the effects is continuous rather 
than discontinuous.   
A temporary or partial shutdown has primarily short-term effects on employment and 
income, and the secondary effects of this on local communities. A temporary or partial 
shutdown might be triggered by environmental compliance issues, or low prices. 
Permanent shutdown involves decommissioning the facilities and reclaiming the land. 
While there is a permanent loss of employment in mining, mill and transportation, there 
is a short-term gain in employment associated with deconstruction and salvage, 
earthmoving and re-vegetation. In most cases there are a few permanent jobs associated 
with ongoing needs for site security and environmental monitoring. Decommissioning a 
mine also terminates various revenue streams that may enter the local economy, such as 
royalties, taxes, rents, local purchases, contributions, profits and dividends. Ideally, 
reclaiming the land restores a range of ecosystem services, although risks from the 
containment of tailings and contaminants remains long term.  
Ecosystem services and potential indicators 
Although poorly understood, ecosystem services directly affect human well-being (Butler 
and Ouloch–Kosura 2005). The Millenium Ecosystem Assessment (MA)–an appraisal 
initiated by the United Nations of global ecosystem conditions–isolates four categories of 
“ecosystem services,” or the benefits to humans derived from healthy, operational 
ecosystems. “Provisioning” services, for example, include commodities like timber, 
minerals, food and water. “Regulating” services include the natural control of climate 
through carbon sequestration or cloud formation, or flood control from healthy wetlands. 
“Cultural” services include the recreational, spiritual, or aesthetic values benefiting 
humans. Finally, “supporting” services include nutrient cycling that enhances or 
maintains the other services.  
Key measures for ecosystem integrity include patch abundance, size, and spatial 
distribution. High resolution imagery from remote sensing can help observe broad-scale 
changes in landscape patterns and provide timely evaluation of ecosystem conditions 
(Bourgeron et al. 1999).  
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Diversity is a key resource of system resilience and adaptation. Biodiversity is a common 
indicator from which to begin assessing an ecosystem’s health, and therefore its ability to 
provide ecosystem services. The UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) defines 
biodiversity as, “the variability of all organisms from all sources…and the ecological 
complexes of which they are a part…including diversity within species, between species 
and of ecosystems.” In “Breaking New Ground: The Report of the Mining, Minerals, and 
Sustainable Development Project,” biodiversity is highlighted as a critical variable when 
considering the effects of mining on the environment: 
Biodiversity’s critical value lies in the choice or options that it supports, for both present 
and future benefits – whether this relates to the alternative food sources it provides, to the 
range of bio-chemicals and processes that underpin modern and traditional medicinal 
products, or the way it increases the resilience of the biosphere’s myriad natural 
processes, from pollination to watershed protection. Humans are somehow dependent on 
biodiversity, so its loss is likely to affect everyone. But those most likely to suffer the 
consequences of biodiversity loss are indigenous peoples or rural dwellers, many of 
whom continue to remain directly dependent on wild habitats and natural ecosystem 
services for their entire livelihood needs, whether by choice or through lack of 
alternatives. (2002: 258) 
These are concepts that are appropriate when considering mining in Arctic regions 
because of subsistence livelihoods and rural economies. The same report adds that,  
The mineral sector has a key role to play in biodiversity maintenance, given that some 
mining ventures can eliminate entire ecosystems and all their endemic species and that its 
activities are increasingly prolific in relatively undisturbed high-biodiversity-value areas. 
(2002: 258) 
Conservation International’s Guide to Responsible Large-Scale Mining identifies several 
vectors through which mining impacts biodiversity, and thus ecological service flows. 
These include, road building, the introduction of alien pests and diseases, vegetation 
clearing, water use and altering its flow, and acid drainage (2000).  
Mining impacts on biodiversity can be examined through the use of bioindicators, or key 
species that are sensitive to the cumulative effects of environmental disturbances such as 
air- and water-born pollutants, invasive species, or habitat loss (Andersen et al. 2004; 
Read et al. 2005; Majer et al. 2007). For example, Majer et al. (2007) investigate 
recolonization of ants in forests of Western Australia that were restored after bauxite 
mining occurred. Due to the strong positive association between species richness and the 
abundance of other taxonomic groups in the ecosystem, ants serve as drivers of 
ecosystem functions and processes and therefore track changes in the biological integrity 
of an ecosystem (Andersen et al. 2004). Hence, bioindicators are often superior to 
pollution parameters in assessing the geographic extent and severity of environmental 
impacts because they respond to cumulative effects of environmental disturbances (Read 
et al. 2005). In an application of bioindicators related to mining in the Arctic, Moiseenko 
et al. (2006) analyzed fish disease to evaluate ecosystem health in lakes of Russia’s Kola 
North region. The authors point out that low biodiversity and short trophic chains found 
in ecosystems of the North result in a highly vulnerable ecosystem where pollutants 
migrate rapidly increasing the severity of damage to the environment.  
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Voilov et al (2004) and other reports recognize that proxies for biodiversity 
measurement, and similarly the quantitative valuation of ecological service flows, are 
difficult and pose a formidable challenge to researchers. In their effort to cross reference 
ecological, economic, and social variables on Russia’s Kola Peninsula, they pursued data 
under different criteria, including: 
1. Hydrologic cycles of the Lake Imandra basin (on the Kola Peninsula); 
2. Population consumption patterns, including land use, mineral extraction, 
water use, food production and consumption (by different sectors of the 
society), and some description of indigenous knowledge of populations living 
in the region before large-scale development began (demographics, ethnology, 
sociology); 
3. Contaminant transport and water quality information; 
4. Biogeochemical cycles (including environmental waste absorption and 
buffering capacity) for various contaminants and nutrients, such as heavy 
metals, phosphates, SOx, NOx, etc.; 
5. Non-renewable resource stocks (e.g., apatite and other ores), depletion rates, 
accessibility and market trends; 
6. Renewable resource stocks (e.g., timber, fish, berries, mushrooms), depletion 
rates, growth rates and market trends (including ecotourism potential); 
7. Environmental change in the region and expected impacts; 
8. Economic assessment of ecosystem services and costs of pollution control; 
9. Ecosystem health indicators (fish stocks, water quality, biodiversity, 
biological productivity, human health, etc.); and 
10. Future alternative development scenarios developed by regional stakeholders. 
Economic effects and potential indicators 
Economic effects are easier to measure. We evaluated four types of measures for 
monitoring economic effects: local mine related spending, mine related employment, 
mining production measured in physical quantities and mining production measured by 
market value. To identify pan-Arctic patterns and monitor trends over time, a good 
indicator must meet four criteria: first, it should be a meaningful measure of local social 
impacts. Second, it should be available for each mine in each Arctic region. Third, it 
should be comparable between different regions and minerals. And fourth, it should be 
comparable over time. Each of the potential measures we identified failed to meet at least 
one of these criteria. 
Local mine related spending could, if available, be the ideal measure of social impacts 
because it could identify all money flowing through a region including payments to local 
employees, governments, land owners and businesses. Unfortunately, mining companies 
consider this information proprietary and it is not generally available. 
Mine related employment is the next best indicator of mining’s social impact because 
employment is a direct social impact of mining. Employment is also an indicator of the 
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size of the mining operation. Unfortunately, employment data is collected and reported in 
different manners in different Arctic regions--e.g. reporting total employees vs. full-time 
equivalent employment, reporting employees by place of work vs. place of residence, 
which support services are included, and whether small scale operations and the self-
employed are included. In addition, some countries only report employment by industry 
data at the national level, lumping Arctic and non-Arctic employment together.  
Mining production has potential to be used as an indicator of mining’s social impact 
because the inputs to mining production drive social impacts. The inputs to mining 
production—employment, payments to local governments, payments to land owners, and 
environmental impacts—have direct social impacts on a region. An increase in a region’s 
mine production increases local spending and therefore mining’s social impact on the 
region. 
Measuring mining production in physical units allows us to compare the year-to-year 
change in the level of mining activity and its associated social impacts one mineral at a 
time. Using mining production measured in physical units as an indicator of the level of 
social impact does not allow one to compare the social impacts of mining different 
products. For example, an increase in gold production within a region has a 
corresponding social impact. But if gold production increases at the same time that iron 
production is decreasing, it is difficult to develop some understanding of the net social 
impact of the mining industry in the region. 
Measuring mining production by market value allows us to aggregate and compare 
production across different minerals. The mineral value of a mine’s production can be 
broken down as the cost of mining—wages, capital and the cost of intermediate inputs—
plus “economic rent,” defined as profits, royalties, land rents and taxes. The cost of 
mining is a direct measure of the level of activity and spending associated with mining. 
Mining activity and spending within a region creates employment and business for local 
vendors, resulting in direct social impacts. By contrast, the economic rents from mining 
do not measure activity and are drivers of social impacts only to the extent that the rents 
remain within the region—most often in the form of local taxes or payments to land 
owners. 
Using the market value of production as a social indicator has two inherent problems. 
First, the market value of a mineral is determined by the global market price for that 
mineral. A short-term increase or decrease in market price will change the market value 
of production but have little effect on the volume of production or the social impact of 
mining. Second, it is an imprecise measure because the relationship between mining 
value and social impact differs between mines: each mining operation has different 
production costs, local value-added and labor characteristics. Furthermore, the reported 
value of production may or may not include costs associated with exploration, mining, 
transportation or refining.  
Mining production index 
To solve the problem of short term price fluctuations which affect value but do not affect 
mining activity or social impacts, we created an index of mining production based on 
long term average price. The mining production index is constructed as the physical 
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production of a mineral multiplied by its long term (1980-2007) average market price. 
One can interpret the mining production index as the mining value that would have 
existed if the mine sold its product at a long run average price instead of the prevailing 
market price. The prices used are from the U.S. Geological Survey mineral commodity 
statistics (Kelly and Matos, 2005), except coal prices which are from IMF commodity 
data for Australian thermal coal (EIA 2009). For diamonds we used a 10-year average 
price (1997-2007) to avoid the price discontinuity due to the break-up of the De Beers 
diamond cartel. The index includes metallic minerals, diamonds from Canada and coal 
from Svalbard, Norway. Most other industrial minerals are excluded from the index due 
to a lack of developed and consistent global market prices. Industrial minerals are 
important in some regions and are briefly discussed in that context. 
The mining production index is a better indicator of social impacts than mining’s market 
value because the Index normalizes mineral price fluctuations. A mining company’s 
decision whether, and on what scale, to develop and operate a mine determines the level 
of mining activity and spending in a region. Mining companies use long term expected 
prices, not current, short term prices when making these decisions. As discussed further 
below, the level of mining activity and spending and associated social impacts are based 
on long term prices expectations and do not fluctuate with market prices. 
As Figure 2 shows, mineral prices are volatile, but real (inflation adjusted) prices tend to 
hover around their long term average with occasional temporary price spikes. Figure 3 
shows the normalized global market price of the minerals used in this analysis and 
indicates the level of price volatility that exists2. Prices are normalized with their 28 year 
(1980-2007) annual average price equal to 1.00. 
                                                 
2 Canadian diamond price, as deduced from Canadian mining data is only reported for the last ten years. 
Prior to this time diamond prices were determined in a monopolistic market and were not representative of 
production costs and social impacts. 
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Figure 2. Normalized real mineral prices, 1900-2007 
 
Source: U.S. Geological Survey, mineral commodity statistics, in Kelly, T.D., and Matos, G.R., 
comps., Historical statistics for mineral and material commodities in the United States: U.S. 
Geological Survey Data Series 140, available online at http://pubs.usgs.gov/ds/2005/140/. (Accessed 
2009.) 
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Figure 3. Monthly mineral price index, 1980 - 2007 
 
Calculated from : U.S. Geological Survey mineral commodity statistics, in Kelly, T.D., and Matos, 
G.R., comps., Historical statistics for mineral and material commodities in the United States: U.S. 
Geological Survey Data Series 140, available online at http://pubs.usgs.gov/ds/2005/140/. (Accessed 
2009) 
Mining production index case study: Alaska 
The effect of the mining production index is demonstrated in the following figures using 
data for Alaska’s mining industry. Figure 4 shows the market value, by mineral, of 
Alaska’s mining industry from 1980 through 2007.  The data show a sharp increase in 
mining market value in 2006 and 2007 with the bulk of the value derived from zinc 
mining. 
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Figure 4. Alaska Mining Value 
 
Source: Alaska Department of Natural Resources, Division of Geological and Geophysical Surveys, 
Special Reports nos. 62, 61, 60, 58, and 38. 
 
For reference, Figure 5 shows the annual zinc price for the same time period as Figure 4. 
The drastic increases in the market value of Alaska’s mining production in 2006 and 
2007 were driven by an increase the market price of zinc during the same period. The 
average price is used to constructing the mining production index and is shown as a 
dotted line. 
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Figure 5. Zinc Market Price, 1980-2007 
 
Source: USGS, Historical Statistics for Mineral and Material Commodities in the United States, 2008, 
2009 
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The mining production index uses the average price for each mineral to calculate the 
normalized value of Alaska mining for each year. Figure 6 shows the Alaska mining 
index for the same period as Figure 4. The spike in 2006 and 2007 has almost 
disappeared while the relative value of each mineral has been preserved. 
 
Figure 6. Alaska Mining Production Index, 1980-2007 
 
 
Figure 6 shows four distinct changes in the level of mining activity in Alaska during this 
period and are reflected in the Alaska mining production index. First, the Red Dog zinc 
and lead mine beginning operation in 1989. Second, Red Dog mine expanded in 1997. 
Third, the Fort Knox gold mine began operation in 1997. Fourth, the Greens Creek gold 
mine began operation in 2006 (Szumigala et al. 2008). While these changes are visible in 
the chart of unindexed mining value, the effect of price increases dominates, muting and 
distorting the impact of the changes in the Alaska mining industry. 
These four increases in Alaska mining activity presumably resulted in increased social 
impact and should have a corresponding increase in mining employment. Employment is 
a direct indicator of social impact of mining and a positive relationship between the index 
and employment would indicate that the index is a reasonable measure. The relationship 
between Alaska mining employment and the Alaska mining production index can be 
observed by graphically superimposing one over the other (Figure 7). This rudimentary 
analysis indicates that the Alaska mining production index and Alaska mining 
employment appear to have a positive relationship. The relative increase in Alaska’s 
mining production index to Alaska’s mining employment that occurs after 1997 is likely 
because labor intensity (labor per unit of product) was lower at Red Dog Mine after it 
expanded, and the Fort Knox mine was less labor-intensive than pre-expansion Red Dog 
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Mine as well. This would result in the production index increasing faster than 
employment. It is important to note that both the index and employment experienced 
increases. 
Figure 7.  Alaska mining employment and production index, 1980-2007 
 
* Production valued at long term average U.S. price (1980-2007), by mineral, in billions of dollars. 
 
The mining production index is inferior to employment as an indicator of mining’s 
economic impact: employment is a direct measure of impact, while the index is an 
indirect measure with more confounding factors. But as we discussed above, employment 
cannot currently be used as a pan-Arctic comparative measure because it is inconsistently 
defined and measured across countries, and in some countries cannot be broken out for 
the Arctic counties. 
Mining production index limitations 
There are four inherent sources of error in the mining production index as a measure of 
economic impact. First, it does not account for the variability of economic rent between 
mines and how much of that rent remains within the region. Second, the production costs 
and the composition of production costs required to produce one unit of mineral 
production vary between different mines. Third, the amount of local value-added varies 
between mines. Fourth, the labor characteristics and labor’s regional impact varies 
between mines. 
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The mining production index does not account for the different economic rent (or profit 
margins) that exist for different mines. The level of economic rent varies between mines 
depending on the relative quality of the resource, the cost of production and the cost of 
transportation, among other things. A mine with larger economic rents will have a 
relatively smaller social impact on the region than the index would indicate. 
The production costs and the composition of production costs required to produce one 
unit of mineral production vary between different mines. For example, Figure 8 shows 
the operating costs for the world’s copper mines, measured in cents per pound of copper. 
It also shows the composition of those costs, broken into five categories: treatment, 
refining and shipping (TCRC & Ship), other onsite, regents, fuel and power and labor.  
Capital costs and economic rent constitute the difference between the operating and the 
market value of each mine. The mines on the left are either capital intensive, highly 
profitable, or both, while the mines on the right are high cost and economically marginal. 
These are the mines most at risk for shutdown if long term price falls below their costs of 
operation. In addition, the variation of the composition of operating costs, especially 
labor costs, indicates more potential error because each type of cost will have a different 
pattern of economic impact. 
 
Figure 8. Mine Costs 
 
Source: World Mine Cost Data Exchange. Accessed 3/18/2009. http://minecost.com/ 
 
Different mining operations also have different degrees of local value-added. Mines with 
more local value-added have a greater social impact on the region than the Index would 
indicate. For example, a mine that ships minerals out of the region still in ore or 
concentrate form will have significantly less associated social impact than a mine that 
does all possessing at the mine site. The index attributes the full final market value of the 
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mineral to the region even if a substantial portion of the value is added outside the region 
through refining and transportation. 
Labor is an important aspect of mining’s social impact on a region. For enclave mines in 
remote areas, as is common in frontier regions, employees often reside outside the local 
region and commute to the mine for work. In this scenario, almost the entire social 
impact of this employment, especially wages, leaves the region. The index does not 
account for this and will over-estimate the social impact of a mine if a significant portion 
of its employees live outside the region. 
The exact relationship between mining value and social impacts cannot be fully 
understood without itemized cost data of individual mines and detailed analysis of the 
impact of those costs. The mining production index is the best available indicator of the 
social impact of mining because, unlike other potential indicators, it is able to measure 
and compare the level of mining activity over time, for different minerals and for 
different locations. 
Trends in Arctic mining  
The Arctic Human Development Report (2004) divided Arctic countries along the lines 
of their economic development, characterizing each half as either a “mature,” or 
“resource frontier” region. The differences between the two types are represented by 
trends in mining. Mature regions have integrated mining operations into a broader, more 
diverse economy, and are well-connected to a national transportation and power grid. 
Frontier regions, on the other hand, are just beginning to develop new mining operations, 
operate in remote, challenging locations, and usually draw labor, supplies, and 
contractors from distant hubs. The mature regions in the Arctic are principally the 
Scandinavian countries – Norway, Sweden, and Finland – while Alaska, Greenland and 
Arctic Canada are characteristically frontier regions. Northwestern Russia, which we do 
not cover in this analysis, is a mature mining region, while central and eastern Siberia are 
frontier. Iceland and the Faeroe islands have no mining (other than sand and gravel which 
we do not consider here).    
Methodology 
The focus of this paper is specific to the role of mining in Arctic regions, with a goal of 
better contextualizing mining’s contribution to social and economic development by 
comparing data across regions and across time. It therefore necessitated, first and 
foremost, an extensive gathering of mining and mining–related data. This information 
was pursued for each Arctic country, with the goal of isolating data for the Arctic share 
of mining, and even further, for the individual sub-regions of the Arctic as defined by the 
Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR). In Norway, for example, data were isolated 
for the counties of Nordland, Troms, Finnmark, and Svalbard, while in Canada data were 
sought for the Yukon Territories, Northwest Territories, and Nunavut. 
Data were sought on mineral production including industrial minerals (specifically 
diamonds and olivine), metal ores, and energy minerals (coal). Gravel and stone 
operations, which generally contribute more to local construction supplies than to 
exports, were omitted in this study. Oil and gas data were compiled separately. Published 
information on mining value, employment, exploration expenditures, and claims data 
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were also collected. These categories are defined and reported differently by different 
agencies across the Arctic, necessitating further research to understand discrepancies and 
make appropriate corrections when comparing between countries. Our transformation of 
the data to facilitate comparison of the mining sector in different countries and identify 
trends is discussed further below.  
We attempted to construct a time series of mining data from 1980 to the present day. The 
availability of historical data varies, and missing data are noted. In some instances, data 
available online were supplemented by research in situ at agency vaults or libraries (in 
Greenland, Alaska, Norway and Russia), as well as personal contact with statistical, 
geological, or mining personnel (in Alaska, Canada, Sweden, and Norway). 
Mature Regions 
The Scandinavian countries continue to host several large, productive mines, but new 
developments, exploration and growth (through 2008) have been minimal.  High prices 
encouraged some investment, but largely at pre-existing mines. The overall value of 
mining in mature regions of the Arctic has increased modestly over time. The following 
country narratives discuss developments in each country since 1980, or the years for 
which data were available. 
Finland (Arctic provinces: Lapland and Oulu, including Kainuu and North Ostrobothnia) 
Mining records in Finland date back to 1530, and Oulu in the Arctic region hosts the third 
largest stainless steel plant in the world (Outokumpu Chrome), supplied by a Lapland 
chromite mine. Domestic iron ore deposits once fed the Raahe carbon steel processing 
plant, but the last mine shut down in 1988 and the plant now relies on imports from 
Sweden and Russia – a telling indicator of Finnish mining itself. 
Besides a historic mining legacy, Finland’s northern economy is well-integrated into the 
larger national economy, and not wholly dependant on resource extraction. Much of the 
minerals extracted there are processed locally. Manufacturing in other industries, 
including telecommunications, outstrip mining’s contribution to the economy of Arctic 
Finland. Even the household incomes in Arctic Finland are only marginally lower than 
those of southern counterparts (McDonald et al. 2006, p. 52), distinguishing it from other 
Arctic regions in this respect. Arctic Finland is therefore not dependent on mining, even 
if it remains an important component of the overall economy. Mining faces an uncertain 
future in places like Finland, where old mines yield fewer new discoveries, but where 
easy transportation exists, and new investment continues. Figure 9 shows the value-
weighted index of mining production in Finland. It demonstrates the relatively constant 
level of production in Arctic Finland, with some normal fluctuations.  
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Figure 9. Arctic Finland mining production, 1980 - 2007 
 
  
* Production valued at long term average U.S. price (1980-2007), by mineral, in billions of dollars. 
 
Sweden (Arctic Counties: Västerbotten and Norbotten) 
Swedish mining is composed of a handful of long-producing mines located in Norbotten 
County. Like in Finland, Swedish mining regions are well-integrated into the greater 
transportation and overall economic network. Within the Swedish Arctic, mining 
contributes a mere 2.5 percent to the economy (compared to 45 percent from services, 
2002). Historic data for Sweden is absent prior to 1992, but Figure 10 nonetheless 
illustrates relatively steady mining production values over recent years in Arctic Sweden. 
Employment, however, has steadily declined over the decades – raising new questions 
about the contribution of mining to the economy as a whole. 
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Figure 10. Arctic Sweden mining production 
 
* Production valued at long term average U.S. price (1980-2007), by mineral, in billions of dollars. 
 
Norway (Arctic Counties: Finnmark, Troms, Nordland, and the territory of Svalbard) 
Mainland Arctic Norway is well-served by road, air, and sea, including deep-water ports 
and sleek, new airports. In spite of important hubs, including Bodø, Tromsø, Alta, 
Hammerfest, and Kirkenes, and important Sámi centers like Kautokeino and Karasjok, 
the north is rural, somewhat remote, and largely dependant on natural resources, such as 
reindeer herding and especially fish. Mining’s contribution to the regional economy, and 
to that of Norway as a whole, is small. Mining comprised a mere .4 percent of Arctic 
employment, and only .8 percent of regional GDP in 2002. The Arctic share of total mine 
output for metal ores and industrial minerals, however, is relatively large, approximately 
40 percent of Norway’s total.  
Mining in mainland Norway is currently not very dynamic. Figure 11 shows the steadily 
declining iron ore production of the only remaining metal mine in the Arctic region; three 
other metal mines closed between 1991 and 2003. Locals have pinned their hopes on oil 
and gas development instead, anxiously awaiting trouble-free production from Snøhvit – 
the much-watched, expensive, and contentious Liquefied Natural Gas facility in 
Hammerfest. Other communities are hoping for their share in Barents Sea oil and gas 
development, including impending developments in Russia. The Norwegian 
government’s High North Strategy (2006) dedicates a brief passage to mining, 
acknowledging a desire for increased development under a regulated framework. This is 
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merely a token compared to the attention devoted to marine resources and petroleum 
activities in the same document.  
On Svalbard, however, coal mining is both an important employer and the only source of 
coal in Norway. Its production has wavered, but has increased dramatically since 2000.  
 
Figure 11.  Arctic Norway mining production, 1980 - 2007 
 
* Production valued at long term average U.S. price (1980-2007), by mineral, in billions of dollars. 
Frontier Regions 
Frontier regions, including Alaska, Canada and Greenland, differ dramatically in 
comparison to mature regions. Mining values have increased steeply, in line with new 
developments, dramatic increases in exploration development and recent high commodity 
prices. Unlike the mature regions, new mines have come online since 1980, and 
undeveloped resources are plentiful. On the other hand, environmental obstacles and lack 
of infrastructure continue to make development challenging. These areas also continue to 
struggle to retain added value from mining operations and generate more sustainable 
local economic development and employment. 
Alaska 
Alaska is a prototypical frontier economy. In mining, much of the product, along with its 
value, is exported out of state. Remote, roadless regions and frozen shipping lanes make 
construction, transportation and exploration both demanding and expensive. But this has 
not deterred an explosion in exploration and development in recent years: record high 
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prices generated a total mineral industry value of over $4 billion in 2007. This was a 100 
percent increase in value compared to 2005, a then record-setting year itself. Exploration 
expenditure increased three-fold between 2005 and 2007, marking the fourth consecutive 
year of dramatically increased exploration expenditures (Figure 12). New gold mines 
throughout the state spurred increases in development spending as well. Unlike the trends 
in mature regions, Alaska’s production index trends steadily upwards (Figure 8). As 
Figure 9 shows, Alaska’s share of total U.S. mineral production by value has increased 
dramatically, from less than one percent in 1980 to nearly 13 percent by 2006. Only very 
recently have prices for zinc, lead and other minerals retreated, if not collapsed, and it 
remains unclear how mining operations will respond. Gold prices have remained 
relatively stable, however, and mines from Southeastern Alaska, Nome, and the interior 
are moving forward with development and production.  
Figure 12. Alaska mining expenditures, 1980-2006 
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Figure 13. Alaska mineral production, 1980-2007 
 
* Production valued at long term average U.S. price (1980-2007), by mineral, in billions of dollars. 
0.0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.6 
0.8 
1.0 
1.2 
1.4 
1.6 
19
80
 
19
82
 
19
84
 
19
86
 
19
88
 
19
90
 
19
92
 
19
94
 
19
96
 
19
98
 
20
00
 
20
02
 
20
04
 
20
06
 
Pr
od
uc
tio
n*
 
Coal Gold Silver Copper Lead Zinc 
   
 25 
Figure 14. Alaska’s share of U.S. mineral production and value, 1980-2006 
 
 
Teck Cominco’s Red Dog mine is of particular importance. Located near Kotzebue in 
northwestern Alaska, it is responsible for over 72 percent of the value of production in 
Alaska in 2006, and two-thirds of U.S. zinc reserves are located at Red Dog. Its ore grade 
is considered of extremely high quality, yielding as much as 480 pounds of valuable lead 
and zinc (combined) for every ton milled - a combined concentration of 24 percent. This 
compares to .023 ounces of gold per ton at the Fort Knox gold mine. One negative effect 
of Red Dog’s extremely high ore content is that its waste tailings still contain relatively 
high concentrations of metals, and will require active containment and monitoring in 
perpetuity.   
The joint venture operating agreement between the NANA Regional Corporation – a 
Native-owned regional corporation organized under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement 
Act (ANCSA) which owns the land and mineral rights – is a model for increasing local 
benefits and regional development in the Arctic. 
Environmental concerns persist in Alaska, however, and challenge development. The 
proposed Pebble Creek copper, gold and molybdenum mine in Southwest Alaska has 
fostered a contentious public debate about the safety of waste ponds. And currently, the 
fate of potential Kensington mine tailings (in Southeast Alaska) is being decided by the 
U.S. Supreme Court. 
Canada (Arctic Territories: Northwest Territories, Yukon Territory and Nunavut) 
Canada exemplifies the changes in Arctic economic systems. It is an advanced country 
with a highly developed southern tier, but resource development dominates the rural 
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economy of the north–a prototypical resource frontier region. Oil, gas, and other types of 
mining–particularly diamonds–have spurred industrial development by Canadian and 
foreign multinational firms in remote areas with difficult climates. Revenues have 
benefited the central government, and to some degree local communities, but much of the 
profit has flowed to the southern tier and distant financial capitals. Effective indigenous 
self-organization, and increased autonomy in Nunavut, has begun to reverse the outward 
flow of profits and stimulate local development.  
For the territories and Nunavut combined, mining and oil and gas accounted for 36.4 
percent of total economic activity in the region in 2004 (Glomsrød and Aslaksen 2006). 
High quality diamonds have established Canada as a major global supplier of the 
precious mineral. Some small companies process diamonds in the Northwest Territories, 
though the majority is exported for processing elsewhere. Nonetheless, the value of 
diamond mining–mostly from NWT mines, and recent additions from Nunavut–rose from 
$791 million in 2002 to $2.1 billion in 2004, then backtracked to $1.4 billion in 2007. 
Diamond mining has spurred economic development by stimulating exploration in the 
north, and through capital expenditures resulting from the expense of building and 
maintaining the mines (Statistics Canada 2008). 
Though mining remains largely undeveloped throughout the Canadian Arctic, with only 
small contributions to the production of minerals other than diamonds and trace amounts 
of gold, its overall share of mining expenditure has grown dramatically (Figure 15). In 
1990, For example, the Arctic share of mining expenditure in Canada was a respectable 7 
percent. It rose dramatically in the early 1990s and now hovers around 25 percent. Figure 
11 shows a corresponding increase in Arctic mine production. 
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Figure 15. Canadian exploration expenditures and the Arctic share, 1980-2006 
 
 
Figure 15. Arctic Canada mining production, 1980 - 2007 
 
* Production valued at long term average U.S. price (1980-2007), by mineral, in billions of dollars. 
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Greenland 
Greenland is a compelling example of heightened search for Arctic non-renewable 
resources. Like Arctic Canada, it is a frontier region with little infrastructure and obvious 
physical barriers to exploration. Exports are 90 percent based on fish – especially shrimp. 
But exploration for petroleum and minerals has recently boomed (Figures 16 and 17). 
The first gold mine started production in 2003 and an olivine (an industrial mineral) mine 
opened in 2004. 
 
Figure 16. Mineral exploration commitments in Greenland 
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Figure 17. Greenland mining production 
 
 
 
* Production valued at long term average U.S. price (1980-2007), by mineral, in billions of dollars. 
Greenland does, however, have a historical legacy of mining, including a now-depleted 
cryolite mine near Ivigtut that was a major contributor to Greenland’s economy before 
1973 (Lycke and Taagholt 1987). 3.5 million tons of cryolite, which aids in aluminum 
production, was extracted before depletion. Between 1956-1962, 130,000 tons of lead 
and zinc were extracted from the Mesters Vig site in East Greenland. 600,000 tons of 
coal was mined at Qutdliqssad on the island of Disko between 1924-1972. There have 
also been reserves identified for Iron, Chromium, Molybdenum, Tungsten, Anorthosite 
and Uranium. None of these were deemed economically viable, but this could change 
(Lycke and Taagholt 1987).  
Complicating the current and future development of resources in Greenland is the 
relationship between Greenland Home Rule Authorities and the Danish government. 
Greenlanders recently voted for increased autonomy and are counting on mineral 
royalties to help finance their home-rule government. Minerals, including oil and gas, are 
being heavily explored for their economic potential. Recent political and institutional 
developments are discussed in greater detail below.  
Other Regions 
Russia (Arctic Regions: The Republics of Karelia, Komi, the Oblasts of Archangelsk, 
Murmansk, and the Autonomous Okrugs of Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets, Taymir, 
Evenks, Sakha, Chukotka, Magadan, Koryakia) 
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The Russian Arctic blends characteristics of the resource frontier with those of mature 
regions. Northwestern Russia has a long history of large-scale mining and well developed 
infrastructure that class it with the mature regions. The central and eastern Arctic also 
have a long history of mining, but because of the vast, remote and largely unexplored 
territory and limited infrastructure, these regions would be classed as frontier. The region 
holds substantial resources and is of increasing interest to Russian officials and 
companies alike. 
Russian statistics are difficult to obtain, assess, and compare with other Arctic regions. 
Data are complicated by different reporting standards and methodologies. Mining 
statistics are not centralized nor available electronically. Our project personnel traveled to 
Anadyr, Chukotka to gather data from paper archives for that region since 1991, but we 
found it to be of limited value for our database. Our discussion below is based on 
secondary sources. 
Northwestern Russia: Murmanskaya Oblast 
Mining in the Murmansk Oblast is supported by a well developed transportation and 
energy infrastructure. From 2000 to 2006 minerals accounted for 32% to 21% of 
Murmanskaya Oblast’s exports (London Metal Exchange 2011). It’s mineral exports 
include iron ore, apatite, nickel, copper, and cobalt.  Murmansk accounts for nearly 100% 
of Russia’s production of apatite. It also produces 12% of Russia’s iron ore and iron ore 
concentrates, 43% of Russia’s nickel, and as a byproduct of nickel mining produces 15% 
of Russia’s copper and 40% of its cobalt.  
In the last decade Murmansk’s iron mines have been integrated into Severstal, a vertically 
integrated, international steel producer (Olenegorsky GOK 2011). The Oblast’s nickel 
mines are now part of Norilsk Nickel, Russia’s largest nickel producer (Norilsk Nickel 
2011). Despite the large role that mining plays in Murmansk, the Oblast’s future seems 
more tied to the development of the Shtokman gas fields in the Barents Sea. Of the ten 
investment priorities listed in the Oblast development plan, only one, the Fedorov Tundra 
enrichment plant, involves mining (Ministry of Economic Development of the Murmansk 
Region 2011). 
Northeastern Russia 
Northeastern Russia, which includes the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Magadanskaya 
Oblast and the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, holds a large portion of Russia’s untapped 
mineral wealth. It has an underdeveloped transportation and power infrastructure, and 
very low population density. These factors all raise the cost of mining operations and 
have focused production on high value minerals. Russia produces about 20% of the 
world’s diamonds and nearly 100% of Russia’s production comes from four mines in the 
Western portion of the Republic of Sakha. In 2008 Russia accounted for approximately 
7% of the world’s gold production, at 163.9 metric tons (Goldsheet Mining Directory 
2011), and nearly a quarter of Russia’s production came from the Northeast.  Similarly, 
in 2009 Russia produced 42.2 million tons of silver or around 6% of the world’s 
production, (The Silver Institute 2011), and Northeast Russia accounted for more than 
30% of Russia’s silver production. Most of the silver produced in this area is a byproduct 
of gold mining (Far Eastern Okrug Natural Resources Report 2011). 
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Mining plays a significant role in the economy of this region. In 2006 the Republic of 
Sakha had more than 22 mining companies operating, while Magadanskaya Oblast had 
118 and Chukotka had 9 mining enterprises. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union there 
have been significant foreign investments in gold mining in this area. Large Russian 
mining conglomerates, like Russia’s largest gold mining company Poly-metal, have 
significant investments and production in Russia’s Northeast (Bloomberg Business Week 
2011). 
This area began intensive gold production in the 1930s under the Soviet’s first five-year 
plans. Production focused on the exploitation of extremely rich placer gold deposits, 
primarily in the Kolyma, Aldan and Lena river systems (Jensen et al. 1983). These placer 
deposits are being depleted, and a significant portion of the remaining reserves are now 
ore deposits (Far Eastern Okrug Natural Resources Report 2011). The move toward 
increased production from ore deposits can be seen in the jump in Figure 18.  
 
Figure 18. Gold production in the Russian Far East 
 
Source data: http://www.tfidvfo.ru/msb/m3.htm (Natural resources report of the Far Eastern Okrug) 
 
A similar trend can be observed in the production statistics for the Republic of Sakha 
(Yakutia), Magadanskaya Oblast, and especially for the Chukotka AO where the start of 
production at the Kubaka mine, an ore based deposit, increased the Okrug’s total gold 
production nine fold in one year (Far Eastern Okrug Natural Resources Report 2011). 
This shift to ore deposits explains not only the increase in gold and silver production, but 
also the influx of new capital into the area.  Ore deposits require greater capital 
investment to exploit than placer deposits. In Chukotka, Western capital financed two 
large gold mining projects, Kupol and Maisekoe. The Kupol project, owned by Kinross 
Gold of Canada, produced its first gold in June 2008. (Shalaginov 2009). In the first half 
of 2009, Kupol had delivered more than 15 tons of gold to the Kolyma Refinery and 
made Chukotka Russia’s largest gold producer (Paxton 2009). The Maiskoe deposit, 
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which is estimated to be larger than Kupol and be one of the five largest gold deposits in 
Russia, is expected to start producing gold in 2012 (Polymetall 2008). Since 2000 the 
Russian government has intensified geological work in Chukotka including new work on 
uranium deposits near Provideniya (Vasilev 2008). 
While this area saw some mining of less valuable minerals like coal, tungsten and tin 
during the Soviet era, the only mines which have survived are those that produce coal for 
local consumption, or have access to developed infrastructure (Vasilev 2008). The large 
coal field at Neryungri Yaktutia, for example, is linked to Russian and international 
markets with a spur from the Baikal-Amur Railroad (Russia Channel 2011).  
Iceland 
Iceland has no significant mining industry, and is not included in this report. It does, 
however, have a growing aluminum smelting industry fueled by cheap geothermal 
electricity, and supplied by year–round ore shipments from Norway. 
Faeroe Islands 
The Faeroe Islands currently have no commercial production of mining resources, though 
there are coal reserves on the island of Suðuroy that were exploited in from about 1770 
through World War II. The Faeroe Islands may confront difficult decisions with respect 
to oil and gas development, however, particularly with how new developments might 
mesh with the economic mainstay of fishing.  
Pan-Arctic Summary 
Figures 19 and 20 summarize the preceding discussion. Production is increasing rapidly 
in the frontier regions of Greenland, Svalbard, Arctic Canada and Alaska, while growth is 
modest in the mature regions of Arctic Finland and Sweden, and showing modest decline 
in mainland Norway. Although data is not available for Russia, reports indicate recent 
growth in mining in the eastern Arctic, and stable production in the Kola Peninsula in the 
mature west.   
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Figure 19. Mining Production Index for Arctic Regions 
  
 
Figure 20. Changes in mining activity, 1992 - 2007 
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Assessing Data 
As noted earlier, each country reports mining statistics differently, and data varies in its 
availability or level of detail. Information is usually divided, or sometimes reported using 
different criteria, between a national mining bureau and a national statistics bureau. 
Canada is particularly thorough in its reporting, with annual reports available online 
including production levels and values divided by mineral, and further reported by 
province, facilitating the isolation of Arctic regions there.  
In spite of recent developments that have improved reporting standards and availability in 
Norway, historical data is largely unavailable online. Historical mining data is likewise 
unavailable in Sweden and Finland in electronic format prior to 1991 and 1997, 
respectively. For this project we were able to obtain some data electronically from NGU 
staff and compiled other data from paper reports in the NGU archives. Unfortunately, 
Norway reports mining data in aggregations that preclude cross-country comparisons for 
Arctic regions. When Norway reports data by mineral, it is aggregated nationwide and 
not broken out by county. When Norway reports production by county, it is aggregated in 
broad categories: energy minerals, metal minerals and industrial minerals. This frustrated 
efforts to distinguish trends, isolate the added value of specific minerals, or construct a 
pan-Arctic index. Detailed geographic knowledge is required to disaggregate statistics for 
the Arctic counties from reported national data by mineral.  
Employment data is also reported disparately between countries and agencies. Historical 
data is regularly unavailable, and reporting standards differ between “full time 
equivalency” (FTE) versus the number of employees, or wage and salary employment. 
Some countries collect employment data by place of residence, while others collect it by 
place of work, or even by the location of the company headquarters. Different reporting 
standards result in very different numbers for the same location, distorting trends over 
time. It is sometimes unclear whether the underlying methodology includes the self-
employed or small-scale mining operations. Again, Canada and Alaska are particularly 
thorough in their reporting and methodologies were recorded and noted. 
In a similar manner, methods for calculating and reporting value of production may vary, 
and may or may not include costs associated with exploration, mining, transportation or 
refining. In most cases, however, it is clear that “value” reflects the value of the final, 
refined product at its global market price. 
Russia poses the greatest logistical challenge for non-local researchers. A combination of 
a lack of centralized data, limited online reporting, a major regime change in the early 
1990s, and language barriers make a comprehensive review of mining statistics especially 
challenging. 
Drivers of change in the Arctic 
Mining is a global industry driven by global markets and global players. Mining activities 
in the Arctic are driven by the same forces and factors as mining in any other region. First 
and foremost is geology: the presence or prospect of major ore deposits is the first 
determinant of industry interest. Available information concerning the geology of a 
   
 35 
region helps a firm decide where to explore, and more information makes a region 
relatively more attractive because it lowers the uncertainty. A second threshold factor is 
access to the land, which is a function of government policies and current land use: an ore 
deposit under a city won’t be developed or considered. Other factors that play include 
expected economic viability, assessment of political risks, and firm-specific strategy 
relative to global markets and supply. Each firm has a portfolio of exploration and 
development options to consider, and a given prospect must compete against others both 
internally and externally to make the cut. And the different lifecycle stages of mining 
activities discussed above each have somewhat different drivers. 
The Arctic is one of the largest remaining frontier regions on the globe, and as such is 
regarded as a vast storehouse of potential resources (AHDR, 2004). Known deposits 
include Red Dog’s world-class lead and zinc mine, Canadian diamond mines like Ekati 
and Diavik, Russia’s Norilsk Nickel, and smaller, but competitive gold mines throughout 
Alaska, Canada, and Greenland. But the Arctic remains relatively unexplored, so the 
potential for major new finds is high. In this respect, the Arctic will continue to be a 
region of particular industry interest for the long term. The Arctic also has vast tracts of 
undeveloped land, so in jurisdictions with favorable government policies, access to the 
resource is relatively attractive. But remote regions of the Arctic, with no existing 
infrastructure, have the countervailing challenge of high costs of development and 
operations.  
In the sections below, we discuss four drivers of particular interest for understanding 
mining trends in the Arctic: market price, technological change, policy changes, and 
climate change. Although we have not attempted to quantify their relative contributions, 
price is clearly the most important and climate change the least important.  
The effects of short and long term price  
The evolution of an undiscovered ore body into an operating mine has three distinct 
phases of capital investment: exploration, predevelopment, and development. The 
exploration phase searches for and identifies large amounts of minerals in a concentrated 
area open to mining development. The predevelopment phase improves the 
understanding of the geological resource and determines if the mine would be profitable 
if developed. The development phase is the actual construction of an operating mine and 
is an expensive capital undertaking, usually an order of magnitude greater than the 
exploration and predevelopment phases. Both junior and major mining companies 
participate in the exploration and predevelopment phase, with the predevelopment phase 
often a joint venture between a junior and a major mining company. Only major mining 
companies have access to the capital necessary, through debt financing, to enter the 
development phase of a mine.  
Short and long term prices have different effects on mining activities at different stages of 
the mine life-cycle. As we discussed in section 2, monthly mineral prices are quite 
variable, with an historically small range of variation most of the time, punctuated with 
occasional spikes in price. While there are no futures markets to track long term price 
expectations, the long term prices that firms use internally for investment planning are 
relatively stable. The revenues of major mining companies, which own operating mines, 
increase in direct proportion to the price increases; the profits increase at an even greater 
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rate. For example, a mine with a 20% profit margin will see its profits increase by six 
fold if mineral prices double3. Major mining companies will become awash in cash when 
prices are high.  
An environment of capital competition exists within mining companies, meaning 
available capital is scarce relative to the amount of potentially profitable projects. Capital 
competition means that potentially profitable projects are shelved only because of lack of 
available capital. Expenditures on exploration and predevelopment projects are 
constrained by the amount of cash the company has on its books. A short term price 
increase will increase the amount of available cash and temporarily loosen the capital 
constraint and allow for more exploration and predevelopment.4 The cash flow from a 
short term price increase is temporary and unpredictable so the investment may not be 
able to be funded to completion. Exploration and predevelopment projects can be stopped 
and then restarted without losing any value of the initial investment. The real option 
value of exploration and predevelopment projects make them a good investment for cash 
generated by short term price increases. 
High prices also make it much easier for junior mining companies to raise equity. Junior 
mining companies only do exploration and predevelopment; they do not develop or 
operate mines. Junior mining companies have no revenue stream and their activities are 
financed through selling equity. The junior mining industry operates under a business 
model that could best be described as a “high stakes gamble” model. If a junior mining 
company finds a profitable ore body it will couple with a major mining company to 
develop the mine, drastically increasing the value of its equity. If it fails to find a 
profitable ore body then it will go bankrupt and investors lose all their money. When 
mineral prices are high, potential investors either perceive that finding a profitable ore 
body is suddenly more likely, or the ore bodies that are already being explored now have 
a much higher value. The result is an increase of equity available to junior mining 
companies, increasing their capacity to explore. 
Short term price increases, therefore, temporarily increase the amount of exploration and 
predevelopment activity in the mining industry, but do not increase investment in mine 
development. Mines are long term investments and can take up to twelve years to 
develop and can last for more than fifty years. Short term price fluctuations are 
meaningless in the analysis of projects with such long time horizons. Instead, mining 
companies use long term price expectations that are not affected by temporary price 
fluctuations. The development phase of a mine is expensive and must be debt financed. A 
major mining company may have multiple profitable development options but can only 
pursue a portion of them without taking on too much debt. A short term price increase 
                                                 
3 Consider a hypothetical mine with annual costs of $8 million and revenues of $10 million. The profit is $2 
million and the profit margin 20% ($2 million/$10 million). If prices double then revenues will also double 
to $20 million while costs remain $8 million. Profits increase to $12 million and the profit margin to 60% 
($12 million/$20 million). A mine with a smaller profit margin will see an even greater relative increase in 
profits. 
4 If there was no capital competition and all potentially profitable projects were already pursued then an 
increase in available capital would increase exploration or predevelopment expenditures. Capital 
competition is prerequisite for short term price increases to cause an increase in exploration and 
predevelopment activity. 
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will not loosen the capital constraint on development projects because it will not increase 
the ability of a company to take on debt. The cash flow from a short term price increase is 
temporary and unpredictable, so a cash-financed investment might not be funded to 
completion. A development project stopped before completion will need to be 
decommissioned and will lose all of the value of the initial investment, making it a more 
risky investment than exploration or predevelopment. 
Short term price fluctuations do not affect the decision to develop a mine but might affect 
the pace and timing of development. A short term decrease in price reduces mining 
revenue and cash may be diverted from development into operations. Likewise, price 
increases will create extra cash that can be diverted to speed development, allowing 
mining operations to commence sooner and possible capture extra revenue by selling its 
first mined products before prices return to normal. The effects of short term price 
changes on the speed of expansion are the same as the effect on development, as the 
decision to expand a mine mirrors the decision to develop one. The decision of when to 
decommission a mine is generally based long term prices but a price fluctuation in the 
final years could speed or delay the actual decommissioning by a few years. 
The number one driver for decommissioning a mine is depletion of the ore body, or 
decline in volume or grade to the point that it is no longer economic to produce. Short-
term changes in prices or costs can affect the timing for shutdown at the margin. Long 
term changes in market demand, or production and transportation costs, or environmental 
or permit requirements can also make a mine uneconomic.  
Technological Changes in Mining and Shipping  
Technological developments have turned previously unfeasible, or economically 
marginal mining deposits into potential investments. Some of these developments are 
specific to the mining industry itself, including improved materials and equipment, while 
some affect exploration or transportation of mineral ore.  
Examples of general technological improvements instituted in the Arctic include new 
developments in seismic exploration and mapping technology which have improved the 
overall understanding of potential deposits in frontier regions and result in more efficient 
exploration. Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated, for example, promoted improved mapping 
and knowledge through the Canada-Nunavut Geoscience Office.  
Other technological processes that are specific to the Arctic include methods to mine in 
permafrost or unstable and melting permafrost. The Diavik diamond mine in Northwest 
Territories is actively freezing existing permafrost to prevent surrounding lake waters 
from inundating the mine. An incident at Red Dog mine in Alaska where a miscalculation 
of permafrost led to a release of contaminated waters from its waste pond and killed fish 
motivated the search for new techniques for building in discontinuous permafrost. 
In the realm of Arctic shipping, Norilsk Nickel has built a fleet of double-ended, ice 
protected vessels that can transport ore year around across the Barents Sea. Operating 
without ice-breaker assistance cuts shipping costs about 30 percent. 
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Mining policies and the effects of devolution in governance 
A number of important political developments, as well as the advent of innovative policy 
making, has increased the autonomy of indigenous peoples in resource frontier regions, 
and therefore their ability to influence the nature and scope of new mining operations 
(Grover et al 2008). 
Nunavut 
Nunavut was born out of the Nunavut Act of 1993, and was made official in 1999. Its 
creation was in part driven by increased natural resource development, and a need to 
better define property rights and regulatory regimes on Aboriginal land. Like Greenland’s 
Home Rule (see below), Nunavut’s government is public and therefore serves all 
inhabitants, not distinguishing between Aboriginals and other Canadians. Also like in 
Greenland, however, the overwhelming majority of citizens are indigenous.  
Important developments regarding mineral rights include provisions under the Nunavut 
Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) for Inuit Owned Lands (IOL) – a portion of which 
includes surface and sub-surface property rights (~2 percent), and a portion of which 
includes only surface rights (~16 percent). The remainder is Crown administered. The 
NLCA states that IOLs are intended to “provide Inuit with rights in land that promote 
economic self-sufficiency through time, in a manner consistent with Inuit social and 
cultural needs and aspirations” (Hardin and Donihee 1997). Ownership of surface rights 
is vested in three Regional Inuit Associations (RIA): Kitikmeot Inuit Association, 
Kivalliq Inuit Association, and the Quikiktani Inuit Association. Inuit-own mineral rights 
are centralized through Nunavut Tanngavik Incorporated (NTI). Importantly, no 
development can take place on IOL without an Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreement in 
place (see section below), partly negotiated by the Nunavut Impact Review Board. 
Dispelling any notions that self-determination in Nunavut means a reduction in resource 
extraction, NTI’s first Vice-President, James Eetoolook, told an audience at the Nunavut 
Mining Symposium in 2000 that, “NTI has clearly committed itself to supporting and 
promoting mining. We want the opportunities that mining can bring. There should be no 
doubt that we support mining and we want it” (speaker’s emphasis). He added that, “we 
have a vision in which the development of our mineral resources – including oil and gas – 
will bring greater prosperity.” Nunavut mining symposiums continue annually, and 
discuss developments in issues ranging from technology to governance and benefit 
sharing. 
While strictly less autonomous than their counterparts in Greenland under Home Rule, 
people in Nunavut have “more possibilities for participating in the institutions of the 
Canadian federal system,” and arguably more influence over resource development there 
(Loukacheva 2007: 151). This is accomplished between efforts to incorporate Inuit 
Qaujimajatuqangit (IQ, or Inuit societal values, knowledge, and wisdom of elders) into 
Nunavut governance structures, and the existence of the NTI, which Loukacheva 
describes as a “powerful land claims organization with 100 percent Inuit membership – 
creating a sort of second level of corporate governance along with Nunavut’s public 
government. This phenomenon does not exist in Greenland (emphasis added)” (2007: 
151). 
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Greenland home rule 
Greenland achieved home rule in 1979. Section 8 of the Home Rule Act of 1978 provides 
that “the resident population of Greenland has fundamental rights in respect of 
Greenland’s natural resources.” While Greenlanders have assumed autonomy with 
respect to natural resource management in fisheries and agriculture, they continue to 
share control of mineral resources with the Danish government. As Grover et al note, 
“this does not give the Home Rule Government control over all natural resources” (2008: 
10).  For minerals preliminary study, prospecting and the exploitation of resources is 
regulated by an agreement between the Danish Government and the Landsstyre. “The Act 
provides for the Landsting to determine that the Landsstyre may not consent to an 
agreement” (10). Ultimately, though the Home Rule Government’s Bureau of Minerals 
and Petroleum grants many of the permits, a joint committee between the Danish and 
Home Rule governments usurps decision-making from Greenland. Different Danish 
bureaucracies house important data, further limiting Greenland’s control. Grover et al 
conclude that, “(The Greenland Home Rule Government) does not have full control over 
mineral resources, although the Home Rule Act recognizes the rights of the population 
over its natural resources” (2008,10). 
Nevertheless, Greenland has taken gradual steps towards self-determination and total 
independence from Denmark. This provides a challenge for Greenland authorities, 
however, whose government and economy benefits from annual subsidies and money 
transfers from Denmark. Greater decision-making with respect to mineral management 
means that a Greenland government needs to fund its developing autonomy. Currently, 
minerals, including oil and gas, are being heavily explored for their economic potential. 
In the Annex to the Programming for the Sustainable Development of Greenland, it is 
written that, “Greenland’s long-term political goal is a more independent economy based 
on its own resources and greater integration into the world economy” (8). Like in 
Nunavut, mineral resources are considered a potential gateway to greater economic 
development, and a means to fund increased autonomy. Unlike in Nunavut, however, and 
in spite of the sophisticated Home Rule Act that grants great autonomy, Greenland 
currently has less input into decisions affecting mineral development than their 
counterparts in Nunavut (Loukacheva 2007). 
Public policy developments and stakeholder involvement 
It is well understood that large-scale resource extraction in remote areas has caused social 
disruption in communities and cultures adjacent to the new developments 
(O’Faircheallaigh 1991; Gibson and Klink 2005; Hipwell et al. 2002; Brubacher and 
Associates 2002; Tatz et al. 2006; North Slave Metis Association 2002). Economic 
benefits–often the only allure of mining to a potential host community–have many times 
escaped the local region. Labor and technical expertise is sought from contract labor 
abroad instead of a local labor supply, royalties go to a central government, and spin-offs 
from the need for suppliers benefit businesses based far outside the local region. 
Recent policy developments, however, are being institutionalized, and normalized into 
business practice, that begin to reverse the harm resulting from mining in frontier regions. 
Natural Resources Canada identifies different agreements between mining companies and 
Aboriginal communities or governments as progress in the area of improved outcomes 
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from mining. These include arrangements as simple as Memorandums of Understanding 
(MOU) between a community and company during the exploration phase, to more 
precise arrangements that consider a spectrum of issues affecting human well-being. 
Some of these include: 
• Socio-Economic Agreements (SEA). The Government of the Northwest Territories 
(GNWT) requires SEAs that compliment already-negotiated IBAs. SEAs have been 
struck in the Yukon Territories as well, and exist, for example, between the Ekati 
Gold Mine and GNWT. 
• Joint Venture Agreements (JVA). JVAs are a business arrangement between 
communities and mining companies that address employment and training, but also 
how profits are distributed. 
• Impact and Benefit Agreements (IBA). (or Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreements in 
Nunavut as required by Arcticle 26 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement). IBAs 
have become particularly important, and almost de rigeur practice for companies 
operating in Canada. As Sosa and Keenan (2001) define them, “agreements are mechanisms for establishing formal relationships between mining companies and local communities. Their primary purposes are: i) to address the adverse effects of commercial mining activities on local communities and their environments, and ii) to ensure that First Nations receive benefits from the development of mineral resources”(2). 
These include agreements regarding funding, training, employment preferences for local 
residents, revenue sharing and environmental concerns. IBAs were struck, for example, 
between Kitkimeot Inuit Association, in Nunavut, and the Jericho diamond mining 
project, as well as the Doris North gold project. A complete list of known IBAs in 
Canada can be reviewed at the IBA Research Network’s website: 
http://www.impactandbenefit.com/IBA_Database_List.html Where not required through a land claims agreement, or by First Nations, government might demand that an IBA be negotiated for a specific project, on an ad hoc basis. Sosa and Keenan (2001) explain further: Such a requirement may be part of an overall social policy to benefit Aboriginal communities or may result because the mine is predicted to have a significant social and/or environmental impact. In the case of the Ekati mine in the Northwest Territories, the mining company BHP and aboriginal organizations voluntarily entered into IBA negotiations. During the approval process for a water license, when an agreement was not yet forthcoming, the Minister of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) made the granting of the license conditional on there being “satisfactory progress” in the negotiations during a 60 day period. The negotiation of IBAs is now considered to be a de facto, albeit unwritten, regulatory requirement in the North. (Sosa and Keenan 2001: 7‐8) 
IBAs have caused some discontent in communities where some regard such an agreement 
with either skepticism of its effectiveness and enforcement, or capitulation that ultimately 
permits development, in spite of ongoing opposition. Shortcomings and imperfect results 
are inevitable, but each of the above developments better insert the values of local 
inhabitants into the development calculus, and better address community concerns. 
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Climate change 
Climate change concerns all parties involved in mining operations in the Arctic and has 
local effects, but it is not an important driver of increased mining overall.  
In Greenland, longer operating seasons and retreating ice are cited by the Bureau of 
Minerals and Petroleum as cause for high expectations of mining exploration and 
development. But climate change also creates new hazards and costs for industry in the 
Arctic. As the Greenland Ice Sheet breaks up, some coastal areas are experiencing 
increases in large ice bergs which create serious hazards for shipping, particularly with 
rapid and unpredictable changes in weather and currents.  
In other regions, infrastructure is threatened by soil instability due to melting permafrost, 
exemplified by the incident with the tailings ponds at Red Dog Mine in Alaska and the 
open pit diamond mines in Northwest Territories, Canada.   
Ice roads are possibly the most integral infrastructure in the Arctic directly impacted by 
climate change. In 1970, temperatures were cold enough to allow safe tundra travel on ice 
roads for more than 200 days of the year, according to the Alaska Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR). DNR statistics now show that period has shrunk to about one hundred 
days (Muse 2008). In 2006, the Tibitt-Contwoyto Winter Road north of Yellowknife, 
which services several diamond mines, was closed weeks earlier than normal because of 
mild temperatures, reducing scheduled shipments to mines by 40 percent. Remaining 
supplies were airlifted at great expense (Katz 2007). Ice road construction costs as much 
as $100,000/mile, according to the North Slope Borough’s Transportation Plan in Alaska 
(2005). Given the great expense of ice road construction, and dwindling seasons, their 
cost-effectiveness might ultimately be reconsidered. 
Ultimately, the effects of climate change vary greatly, and local effects determine its 
influence on mining operations and exploration. 
Summary and Recommendations 
In this paper we have sought to review and assess potential indicators for monitoring 
social effects of mining on Arctic communities. We would like to be able to monitor 
social effects through ecosystem services pathways as well as economic pathways, as 
mediated by institutions. Monitoring social effects through less tangible pathways 
affecting fate control, cultural continuity and ties to nature is further off, as it will first 
require development of a conceptual model. 
The most universal measures we found address mineral production and value. We found 
these to be imperfect proxies for economic or social effects. We found no generic 
measure of effects on ecosystem services.  
We also reviewed and assessed the state of data to describe and monitor mining trends in 
the pan-Arctic. We found that historical data on mineral production and value is 
unavailable in electronic format for much of the Arctic, specifically Scandinavia and 
Russia. Completing the historical record back to 1980 will require work with paper 
archives.  
Trends in mining activity include stasis or decline in mature regions of the Arctic, and 
strong growth in the frontier regions. Climate change has diverse and regionally-specific 
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effects, and does not contribute to trends overall. The biggest driver in the Arctic frontier 
is the availability of large, undiscovered and untapped resources with favorable access 
and low political risk. 
The most critically needed improvement in data collection and reporting is to develop 
comparable measures of employment. The eight Arctic countries each use different 
definitions of employment, and different methodologies to collect the data. We 
recommend that the Arctic Council call a convention of statistical agencies across the 
eight countries to define and develop one measure of employment that is common to all. 
Furthermore, many countries do not report employment by county and industry, so the 
Arctic share of mining employment cannot be identified. This should be part of the Arctic 
Council call. (If there are confidentiality problems due to the small number of northern 
mines, in the Scandinavian countries for example, the Nordic Council countries could 
pool their data for reporting.) 
More work needs to be done developing indicator measures for ecosystem service flows. 
The leading candidate is developing a generic measure of biodiversity that can be used to 
compare across regions and across time. The successful application of bioindicators in 
monitoring environmental impacts from production and mine-closure in Australia shows 
that a similar approach could be pursued in Arctic regions. Finding suitable bioindicators 
for Arctic ecosystems is essential and could target species that are abundant, easy to 
sample, and sensitive to mining impacts. 
More work also needs to be done developing conceptual models of effects of mining 
activities on fate control, cultural continuity and ties to nature for local Arctic 
communities.  
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